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Foster Placement Review: Problems
and Opportunities
I. Introduction
Foster care' is intended to provide temporary out-of-home child
care until the biological parents are able to provide an adequate
home for their children.2 Yet thousands of children today spend a
major part of their childhood drifting from one foster placement to
another, with little or no contact with their biological parents.3 Con-
cern for the increasing number of children left in foster care for
lengthy periods4 at serious cost to the child's sense of permanence 5
and financial burden to the government, has prompted some states
and localities to implement programs of periodic review' of children
placed outside their homes.7
This comment analyzes the various child placement review
schemes that have evolved. The dilemma of foster children left "in
limbo" is examined and typical legislative review paradigms are de-
scribed and evaluated. Moreover, elements necessary among all the
review systems for effective reviews are explored. Finally, attention
1. As used herein, foster care is 24-hour child care outside the home of the child's le-
gally recognized parent or guardian provided for children who enter the foster care system
through a child welfare agency or the courts.
2. Steketee, The CIP Story, 28 Juv. JUST. 4, 4 (1977).
3. See notes 10, 23-25 and accompanying text infra
4. See In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 700, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1969), for judicial
recognition of the problems of children left in prolonged foster care. See also Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
5. See Goldstein, Why Foster Care - For Whomfor How LongZ 30 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 647 (1975).
6. Child placement review programs are classified into three types herein: internal
agency review, judicial or court-administered review, and citizen board review. For further
explanation of these categories see Part III infra
7. See In re Dionisio R., 81 Misc. 2d 436, 366 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1975) (the court notes that
the legislature in enacting § 392 of the Social Services Law (providing for review of foster care
placements) hoped not only to save money but also to prevent foster children from becoming
"lost" children and to expedite the making of permanent plans for them); State of New Jersey,
Statement of Insts., Health and Welfare Comm. to Senate Comm. Substitute for Senate, No.
3246, 1 (1977) (describing the New Jersey bill (now N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30,.4C-50 to 4C-65
(West Supp. 1978)) as a response to inappropriate placement of children in foster care for
lengthy periods).
Since this comment was written New Jersey has amended its child Placement Review Act
by enacting Senate Bill 1208 on October 16, 1978. The two versions may still be beneficially
contrasted.
is given to factors external to a review system that significantly affect
the success of the system. Throughout this treatment the respective
interests of the child, biological parents, foster parents, child care
agency,8 and public are considered.
It is hoped that this analysis will serve as an impetus for devel-
opment of programs of independent child placement review9 by
states that currently have no provision for these programs, and also
as an aid in selecting a review scheme best tailored to local needs
and resources. Issues likely to arise in the formation of a review pro-
cedure have been identified and resolutions suggested. States that
have already enacted child placement review legislation should find
this comment helpful in re-examining areas of their procedure that
do not promote effective review or adequately safeguard the rights of
the concerned parties.
II. Problem Observed
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare estimates
that between 400,000 and 450,000 children' 0 are currently in tempo-
rary foster care placements"I in the United States.' 2 The combined
8. The terms "agency" or "child care agency" are used herein to describe any child
welfare agency, public or private, that is responsible for children removed from their parental
home or for placing children in foster care.
9. The phrase "independent child placement review" refers to any placement review
system that operates outside the auspices of the child care agency responsible for placement of
the child.
10. The number of children in temporary foster care placements has increased in the past
several years. In 1959 an estimated 254,000 children were in foster care in the United States.
H. MAAS & R. ENGLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 417 (1959). By 1973 that estimate
had climbed to 285,000. Mnookin, Foster Care - In Whose Best Interest, 43 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 599, 600 (1973). In late 1975 the estimate of children in foster care reached 400-450,000.
Joint Hearings on Foster Care Before the House Subcomm. on Select Education and the Senate
Subcomm. on Children and Youth, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Hearings] (statement of John C. Young, Commissioner, Community Services Administration,
Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare).
11. About 75% of these 400-450,000 children are in family foster care (child lives in home
of foster parents who act as substitute parents), 2% in group homes (group of children placed
in a shelter with caretakers who act as parents), and the majority of the remaining 23% in
institutions (public or private, and often are reserved for children with special problems such
as drug abuse, emotional disturbance, mental retardation, physical handicaps, or delinquency).
1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 35 (statement of John C. Young).
Children are temporarily placed in foster care for a variety of reasons. E.g., 1975 Hear-
ings, supra note 10, at 35 (statement of John C. Young) (foster placements occur because of
broken homes, abuse or neglect by parents or caretakers, mental or physical handicaps of the
child that cannot be handled at home, behavioral problems of the child, refusal of the parent
or parents to care for the child, and inability of the parents to care for the child because of their
mental or physical incapacity, disaster, or loss of shelter). See also Festinger, The New York
Court Review of Children in Foster Care, 54 CHILD WELFARE 211, 221 (1975); S. VASALY,
FOSTER CARE IN FIVE STATES: A SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS OF STUDIES FROM ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, IOWA, MASSACHUSETTS, AND VERMONT, U.S. Dep't of HEW Pub. No. (OHD)
76-30097, 23 (1976); Comment, In the Child's Best Interests.- Rights of the Natural Parents in
Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 457 (1976) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U.
L. REV.].
12. Some statewide figures for children in foster care are noted here to permit compari-
cost to federal, state' 3 and local governments of providing foster care
for these children is estimated to be over seven hundred million dol-
lars per year."
Nationwide, approximately fifty percent of all children are
placed in foster care voluntarily.' 5 The "voluntary" nature of child
placement, however, has been seriously questioned.' 6 Parents may
consent to temporarily relinquish their child only to avoid a court
proceeding.1 7  Temporary surrender of a child to agency custody'
8
may become involuntary at a later date, because of placement agree-
ments that many states require parents to sign when surrendering
son of the type of state review system selected by size of state foster care population. H. GOL-
DIN, THE CHILDREN ARE WAITING: THE FAILURE To ACHIEVE PERMANENT HOMES FOR
FOSTER CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY, 2 (1977) (New York - 29,000); M. JONES, FOSTER
CARE REVIEW SYSTEMS: A REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDA-
TION FOR A PENNSYLVANIA REVIEW SYSTEM, U.S. Dep't of HEW Pub. No. R03-1663-77, 25
(1977) (Pennsylvania - 12,000 children in foster care); J. PERS, GOVERNMENT AS PARENT: AD-
MINISTERING FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA, 1 (1976) (California - 30,000); Interview with
William Van Meter, Assistant Administrator, Office of Program Support, New Jersey Division
of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) (Aug. 18, 1978) [hereinafter cited as N.J. DYFS Inter-
view] (New Jersey - 11,000); Fact sheet, Children's Foster Care Review Board System and
Office of Child Advocacy, Columbia, South Carolina (1977) (South Carolina - 4,000).
13. The 1977 estimated cost of maintaining a child in foster care in Pennsylvania for one
year is $1452, excluding such expenses as clothing and medical and dental expenditures. M.
JONES, supra note 12, at 26. In New York the estimated cost of maintaining a child in foster
care for one year is $4964, and the total yearly cost to the public for foster care in New York is
$280 million. H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 2. See also S. VASALY, supra note 11, at 118.
For cost estimates of various state child placement review systems, see M. JONES, supra
note 12, at 38-39. For estimated state and local government expenditures necessary to imple-
ment the New Jersey Child Placement Review Act, see State of New Jersey, Fiscal Note to
Senate Comm. Substitute for Senate, No. 3246, 1 (1977).
14. This estimated cost is for 350,000 foster children in 1975. The lowest estimate of cost
per child by HEW for one year of foster care in 1975 was $2000. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10,
at 20, 27 (statement of John C. Young).
15. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE
1 (Feb. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Legal Issues in Foster Care]. "Voluntary placement" is the
out-of-home placement of a minor by a child care agency at the request of a parent, guardian,
or person standing in loco parentis and is usually accomplished without court supervision. In
contrast, "involuntary placement" is the out-of-home placement of a minor by a child care
agency pursuant to court order. This latter category includes placement of abused, neglected
and abandoned children, juvenile delinquents, and status offenders.
For statewide estimates of number of foster children voluntarily placed, see H. GOLDIN,
supra note 12, at 3 (New York - 82%); J. PERS, supra note 12, at 15 (California - 50%); Geiser,
The Shuffled Child and Foster Care, 10 TRIAL 27, 27 (1974) (Massachusetts - 50%); Levine,
Caveat Parens A Demyst#iFcation of the Child Protection System, 35 U. PITT. L. REV, 1, 29
(1973) (Pennsylvania - 90%); N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12 (New Jersey - 75%).
16. See, e.g., J. PERS, supra note 12, at 43; Mnookin, supra note 10, at 601.
17. E.g., in New Jersey parents must be given an opportunity to voluntarily surrender
their child before a court proceeding is brought charging them with neglect or abuse. N.J.
DYFS Interview, supra note 12. See also Mnookin, supra note 10, at 601.
18. When a child is voluntarily or involuntarily removed from the home of his biological
parents, legal custody generally shifts from the parents to the child care agency. After the
child is placed in a foster home, the agency retains legal custody and the foster parents have
only physical custody of the child. The placement of a child in a foster home is usually gov-
erned by a contract signed by the foster parents and agency. This contract will normally state
that the foster parents are to receive a monthly payment from the agency to meet the child's
expenses, in return for which the foster parents agree to provide for the child's physical needs
and to show genuine concern for the child. Legal Issues in Foster Care, supra note 15, at 21.
their children.' 9 Although in some states this agreement provides
that return of the child to the parents is automatic upon request,20 in
other states the agency may refuse the parents' request to return the
child if agency staff determine that they are not prepared to resume
custody at that time.2' The parents must then resort to a habeas
corpus proceeding for the return of their child.2 2
Although foster care was designed as a means of short-term care
of children, it has become more than a temporary waiting station.
The average length of stay for a child placed in foster care is five
years.23 Most foster children experience more than one placement
24
19. Examples of states requiring placement agreements include California, CAL. WELF.
AND INSTS. CODE § 16552 (West Supp. 1978) (demonstration counties only) (right to return of
child within 24 hours during first three days of placement, and thereafter within fourteen days
after written notice of request for return of child is given to county welfare department; agree-
ment not to exceed six months without review by an administrative board); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.07 (West 197 1) (child returned upon request if in the opinion of the placing
agency or commissioner of public welfare the best interests of the child require return); New
Jersey, N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12 (when parent requests return of child, agency must
return child or show in court that the best interest of the child would not be served by his
return); New York, N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 384-a (McKinney Supp. 1978); Ohio, OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 5103.151 (Page Supp. 1978); and Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MANUAL FOR SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH, TITLE 3200, REGU-
LATIONS PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES, regs. 3220 C, 3231 D (1969) (return of child if
approved by agency).
20. See, e.g., California statute at note 19 supra
21. See, e.g., Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County Inst. Dist., 461 Pa. 641, 337 A.2d 586
(1975) (voluntary placement agreements executed by parents and a child care agency that con-
dition return of the child upon agency approval are not violative of fourteenth amendment due
process).
The dilemma surrounding placement agreements centers around whether they should be
treated as a strictly contractual arrangement or whether inquiry should be made into the par-
ents' improved situation at the discretion of the agency before the child is returned. See, e.g.,
Teeter v. Pruiksma, 82 Misc. 2d 88, 367 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1975) (favoring the contractual aspects
of the placement agreement); cf Ruth v. Beaudoin, 55 App. Div. 2d 52, 389 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1976) (implied contractual right to have the child returned on demand cannot and should not
prevent court inquiry to determine the best interests of the child); Commonwealth v. Chil-
dren's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973) (noting that contracts concerning the
custody of children are voidable agreements subject to being set aside if in the best interests of
the child).
One argument in favor of honoring the terms of the agreement is that if the child is not
returned to the parent upon demand, parents will be discouraged from surrendering the child
because of fear of relinquishing a right to custody and care, and ultimately the child will suffer.
Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County Inst. Dist., 461 Pa. 641, 652, 337 A.2d 586, 591 (1975)
(Nix, J., dissenting).
22. N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note i, at 459. See alro Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County
Inst. Dist., 461 Pa. 641, 652, 337 A.2d 586, 591 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting) (responsibility to
initiate a proceeding and sustain the burden of proof should lie with the agency if the agency
refuses to return the child).
23. This average is gathered from a composite of studies across the country. See Maas,
Children in Long-Term Foster Care, 48 CHILD WELFARE 321, 323 (1969) (31% of the children
studied from all over the country were in foster care ten or more years, 52% for six years or
longer, 24% spent between three and six years in foster care and 24% left care in less than three
years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978) (seven out of ten children placed in
foster care in Florida do not return to the home of their legal parents within the first year);
Geiser, supra note 15, at 29 (average length of stay in foster care in Massachusetts is five
years); N.J. DYFS Interview, upra note 12 (average length of placement in New Jersey is 5.1
years); H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 10 (mean number of years of care for children in foster
and visit infrequently or not at all with their biological parents.
Case review of children in foster care (before the implementation of
child placement review systems and in those states presently without
such a system) is within the province of the child-placing agency.
The frequency and thoroughness of these reviews are within the
agency's discretion.26
III. Description and Evaluation of the Review Schemes
Any meaningful child placement review system should seek to
halt needless entry into foster care and to move children out of foster
care and into permanent homes27 as quickly as possible. Social
scientists have observed that "children require affection, protection,
guidance, and care in [sic] a direct, intimate and continuous basis by
adults who are personally committed to assume such responsibility.
It is crucial that the child feel wanted. ' 28 Authorities also agree that
care in New York City is from 4.3-5.2 years); M. JONES, SUpra note 12, at 15, 25 (60-68% of
children in foster care in Pennsylvania have been in care more than two years and of these
children 26-38% have been in care seven years or more). See also S.VASALY, supra note 11, at
54.
24. Eg., Geiser, supra note 15, at 29 (nationwide, average number of placements for a
child in foster care is 2.7, including one-third of children who have from three to seven moves);
N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12 (on the average, children in foster case in New Jersey
have been in two different placements); H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 10 (45% of foster children
in New York City had been in one foster home, 26% in two foster homes and 29% in more than
two foster homes); Interview with Barbara Chappell, Director, Children's Foster Care Review
Board System and Office of Child Advocacy, Columbia, S.C. (Aug. 17, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as S.C. Chappell Interview] (average number of placements for foster child in South Carolina
is three). See also S. VASALY, supra note 11, at 56.
25. Eg., N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12 (43. 1% of children in foster care in New
Jersey have not visited their biological parents in one year or more); Festinger, supra note 11,
at 241 (25% of children in foster care in New York City studied had no contact with biological
parents since initial placement and another 25% had no contact in six months or more); S.C.
Chappell Interview, supra note 24 (50% of children in foster care in South Carolina have not
seen their biological parents in one year or longer). See also Steketee, supra note 2, at 7; S.
VASALY, supra note 11, at 33, 52.
26. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PROJECT EVALUATOR, CHILDREN IN PLACEMENT PROJECT 13, Appendix B, Table 3 (July 8,
1976) (unpublished) (available at address in Note 50) (data compiled from review of court-
ordered foster care placement records in 12 cities across the United States showed that in
30.7% of the cases, no court review or action had been taken in 3-10 or more years, although in
nearly one-half of the cases parental rights has been terminated over five years ago). See also
study reported in Backus, Foster Care Review. An Ohio Example, 57 CHILD WELFARE 156,
158-59 (1978) (study of the agency review procedure indicated the need for continuous moni-
toring of the cases of children in the custody of agencies).
27. The phrase "permanent home" refers to a child living with his biological parents,
relatives, or guardian, or with persons by whom he has been legally adopted. Foster care is not
considered to provide a permanent home because the child is frequently moved from one
foster home to another and placement is of uncertain duration.
28. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 11 (statement of Dr. Albert J. Solnit, Director, Child
Study Center of Yale University). Dr. Solnit suggests standards for planning and review of
children in foster care, e.g., children between the ages of 4-6 should be in temporary foster care
for no more than 12 months, and children 6 and older should not be placed in temporary foster
care for longer than 18 months. Id at 12-14. See also In re Orzo, 84 Misc. 2d 482, 488, 374
N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1975) (court describes as "every child's birthright-a permanent, stable,
upon removal of a child from his home, the agency and biological
parents should cooperate to make a plan specifying the intended
length of the separation and the action that will be taken by both
parties to promote return of the child to his home.
2 9
Within the past eight years a number of states have adopted
legislation requiring some type of periodic review of children placed
outside their homes. Approximately twenty states now have some
type of placement review system,3" although the class of children af-
fected, the frequency of review, and the composition of the reviewing
body vary significantly. Generally, the different review systems can
be classified into three basic types:3'agency, judicial or court-admin-
istered, and citizen board review.
32
A. Agency Review
Agency review refers to an internal procedure of periodic case
review by a panel of social services workers according to a legisla-
tively mandated schedule.33 Case review by the child care agency
responsible for placing the child is the least expensive of the three
methods of review. The staff needed to conduct reviews is already
available34 and is familiar with the operation of the child care sys-
tem, the delivery of supportive services in the community, and the
obstacles to providing children with permanent homes. Since only
the agency staff and perhaps a judge, if the agency petitions the
court, will view personal records of the concerned parties, the prob-
loving and nurturing home"); Bronfenbrenner, Nobody Home: The Erosion of the American
Famiy, 12 PSYCH. TODAY 40, 43 (May, 1977).
29. See, e.g., Steketee, supra note 2, at 5; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Ne-
glected" Childrer Standards/or Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status
of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 679
(1976). A written statement of the responsibilities and performance of both parents and
agency can be used to promote a clearer understanding between the parents and the agency
and to serve as documentation in any further proceeding.
30. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES: AN EXAMINATION OF
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY TO CHILDREN IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE, Appendix L (1978); Wald,
supra note 29, at 632. See Clayburn, Magura, & Resnick, Periodic Review of Foster Care: A
BriefNationalAssessment, 55 CHILD WELFARE 395 (1976).
31. One exception to this model is the "Oregon Project," supported by a grant from the
U.S. Children's Bureau, Office of Child Development, Dep't of HEW. The project staff se-
lected cases of foster children who were not likely to return home and made them the focus of
an intensive permanent placement effort. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO PLANNING FOR CHIL-
DREN IN FOSTER CARE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEW PUB. No. (OHDS) 78-30138 (1978).
32. Many states have adopted a review procedure that is a hybrid of two or more of these
categories. Eg., the New Jersey legislative scheme requires judicial review within fifteen days
after the court is notified of the removal of the child from her home, and citizen board review
within 45 days after initial placement and annually thereafter. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-50 to
4C-65 (West Supp. 1978).
33. The Ohio system comes closest to demonstrating the agency review concept although
Ohio requires the agency to submit a report of each review to the court or, alternatively, to a
citizen board for approval. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.151 (Page Supp. 1978).
34. Implementing a review system would probably require a reorganization of existing
agency personnel and possibly the acquisition of additional staff.
lem of disclosure of confidential records to laypersons during re-
views is avoided. 35  Aggressive caseworker attitudes may have a
great impact on reducing the number of children in foster care
36
without the increased bureaucratization 37 accompanying more elab-
orate review systems.
Numerous disadvantages, however, attend this type of review.
Internal agency review presents a conflict of interest because the
agency monitors its own performance. 3  The perspective of the
agency may not conform with the best interests of the child or the
parent, because the agency has an interest in maintaining children in
care for continued funding.39 Also, agency workers may become
reconciled to a foster care placement for a child,4" or may be hin-
dered in finding permanent placements because they are assigned
heavy caseloads.
Internal case review has not proved effective in finding perma-
nent homes for children.' Children have been kept in foster care for
lengthy periods42 during which ties to their biological family
weaken; they have been transferred from one foster home to an-
other,4 3 severing the emotional bond created between the foster par-
ents and child; and agencies have failed to move quickly to place
35. See notes 181-95 and accompanying text infra.
36. See, e.g., Jones, Aggressive Adoption." A Program's Effect on a Child Welfare Agency,
56 CHILD WELFARE 401 (1977). The "Aggressive Adoption" program, developed in Cumber-
land County, Pennsylvania, established a separate adoption unit that worked in cooperation
with the agency foster care staff to make adoptive plans for as many foster children as possible.
The increase in the number of children adopted was significant.
37. See E. CLAYBURN AND S. MAGURA, FOSTER CARE CASE REVIEW IN NEW JERSEY:
AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS 3 (1977) (Final Report of a Research
Project funded by the Dep't of HEW) (independent child placement review criticized because
it does not confront the problems of obsolete state laws, insufficient preventive and supportive
family services, lack of subsidized adoption programs, insufficient casework staff, and family
problems stemming from low socioeconomic status).
38. Chappell & Hevener, Periodic Review of Children in Foster Care.- Mechanismsfor Re-
view 3 (Child Service Association publication) (Mar. 1977). See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5103.151(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1978). No judicial or external review is undertaken in this pro-
gram except review by the court of a written report of every foster care review that the agency
is required to prepare and submit to the court. The report compares the agency's performance
with what is in the best interests of the child.
39. See H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 18; M. JONES, supra note 12, at 15-16 (financial
incentive needed for private agencies to release children for adoption); Wald, supra note 29, at
679.
40. See, e.g., In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1966).
41. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24. See also Analysis of 1977 Review of Chil-
dren in Placement, New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services 2 (1977) (unpublished)
(available in Dickinson Law Review files) (in over 60% of the cases of children in foster care
placements in New Jersey in 1977, the goal listed by the caseworker in a 1977 foster care
survey was to maintain the child in foster care); H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 18 (agency
personnel have not made an adequate effort within a reasonable period to free children for
adoption and to recruit adoptive parents).
42. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
children for adoption once parental rights have been terminated.44
Another disadvantage of intra-agency review is that it often fails
to provide safeguards incorporated in alternate review systems. Un-
like typical citizen review boards 45 or judicial hearings' that afford
interested parties notice prior to the review, the opportunity to attend
the review and to be heard, and the right of appeal, internal agency
review generally makes no provision for notice to the parents, foster
parents, or child. These parties are not present at the agency review,
nor are they allowed to send a representative, and a route of appeal
to an independent authority from agency actions or decisions may
not be specified.47
Although periodic review of cases by social services staff alone
is inadequate to find permanent homes for children in foster care,
when supplemented by one of the following forms of independent
review, it provides a necessary component of a system of indepen-
dent child placement review.48
B. Judicial or Court-Administered Review
Judicial or court-administered review takes two forms: (1) pure
judicial review,49 in which a judge personally reviews the cases of all
children who have been in foster placement for a certain length of
time; and (2) court-administered review,5" in which a staff composed
either of voluntary workers or employees of the court periodically
reviews the cases of children placed in foster care and selects those
44. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
45. See Part III, section C infra.
46. See Part III, section B(l) infra.
47. Compare N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 43-13-
50 (Supp. 1978); and STATE ADVISORY BOARD, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RE-
LATING TO THE CHILDREN'S FOSTER CARE REVIEW BOARD SYSTEM IN SOUTrH CAROLINA, 17-
19 (Aug. 1977) (unpublished) (available in Dickinson Law Review files) [hereinafter cited as
S.C. PROCEDURES MANUAL] with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.151 (Page Supp. 1978).
48. Chappell regards agency review as complementary--"for case planning but not ac-
countability." S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24.
49. The New York judicial review system has the longest history, having been enacted in
1971. N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (the authorized child care agency
must petition the family court to review status of foster children who have been in placement
for a continuous period of eighteen months, and review occurs thereafter at twenty-four month
intervals). Another state using a judicial review system is Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168
(West Supp. 1978).
50. Court-administered review is exemplified by the Concern for Children in Placement
Project (CIP) sponsored by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges. Phase I of this
project, currently in effect in twelve cities across the United States, requires trained volunteers
to review periodically cases of children in court-ordered foster care. The goal of the project is
to promote removal of foster children from temporary care. Phase II expands the number of
program sites. See materials provided by CIP Staff, National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges, P.O. Box 8978, Reno, Nevada 89507.
cases that they determine require judicial attention.5 I
L Pure Judicial Review.-Periodic and rigorous court review
of foster care placements by a concerned judge who is trained and
experienced in the child care field is a paradigm against which all
other systems should be compared. 2 The court commands the re-
sources to gain the most complete understanding of the family's situ-
ation and to enforce its decision. 3 A judge can conduct a searching
review of the case, scrutinizing the actions of parents, agency, and
child, and he can set realistic goals for movement of the child out of
temporary care. The court provides an impartial forum with due
process requirements to protect the rights and interests of all parties.
A judicial determination has the additional strong advantage of
qualifying a state for federal funding at an increased level under Ti-
tle IV-A of the Social Security Act.54
The major disadvantages of judicial review are the cost,
notwithstanding increased federal funding of children in foster care,
and the amount of judicial time needed for thorough review. 5 The
expense of judicial monitoring of cases has resulted in brief 6 and
51. A staff is used to minimize the cost of the review procedure and to maximize the time
that a judge can spend on cases demanding of his attention.
52. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 3 (statement of The Honorable John P. Steketee,
Chairman, Children in Placement Project sponsored by the National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges).
53. Judicial decisions carry more weight than decisions or recommendations of court
workers or review boards. Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 3.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1976). When a child from a family that is otherwise eligible for
AFDC is placed in foster care as a result of a judicial determination that continued stay of the
child in his home is contrary to the welfare of the child, the state qualifies for an increased
level of federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 608(0 (1976) requires that a plan, including provision for
periodic review of the need for out-of-home child placement, be developed for each child.
HEW regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 220.19(c) (1978), require a state to determine continued appro-
priateness of and need for placement through periodic reviews, at least annually.
The increase in the level of federal funding is substantial. For example, New Jersey
would be eligible to obtain an estimated $1.5 million in the first year of its review program and
more than $3 million by the third year. State of New Jersey, Statement of Insts., Health and
Welfare Comm. to Senate Comm. Substitute for Senate, No. 3246, 2 (1977). An initialjudicial
determination upon removal of the child from his home suffices to qualify for the increased
level of funds.
55. The legislature would have to double the number of family court judges in South
Carolina to meet the foster placement review caseload if judicial review was implemented,
according to a review board administrator. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24. New
Jersey has also found judicial review too expensive to adopt. Address by Harold Rosenthal,
Acting Director of the Division of Youth and Family Services, State of New Jersey, Confer-
ence on PermanencySecurity and Love: A Child's Right (Apr. 5, 1977).
56. E.g., Wald, supra note 29, at 683; Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication. Judicial
Functions in the Face ofIndeterminancy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROa. 226, 274-75 (1975). Annual
review hearings in each of two California counties were observed in two independent studies.
In both counties the majority of hearings lasted between two and five minutes. Typically,
neither the parent nor the caseworker were present, neither the need for continued placement
nor the efforts being made to facilitate return of the child to his home were examined, and no
plans were made. In one county approximately two-thirds of the hearings took two minutes or
less, 6% took ten minutes or more, and the longest review lasted twenty minutes. Nearly all the
case decisions were based upon information from two to three page reports prepared by
infrequent57 reviews. A child may remain in foster care for a period
of years before the reviewing process is effective in freeing him for
permanent placement, which counteracts the benefits intended by
the law. Judicial review may best be used, therefore, in combination
with review by a panel of citizens, because each reviewing body can
supplement the strengths of the other.5"
2. Court-administered Review.-The use of a trained staff to
screen cases allows the judge freedom to spend more time with cases
in which a child is not moving towards a permanent placement.59
The judge himself may choose to review all cases at wide intervals,
interspersed with the administrative review, or he may review only
those cases brought to his attention by the periodic examination of
placement records by his staff. These methods are less expensive
than judicial review of every case.' Court-administered review
alone, however, would not enable a state to qualify for an increased
level of federal funding, without an initial judicial determination
that removal of the child from his home would be in his best inter-
ests.6
An administrative system of review has other deficiencies not
encountered in some of the schemes. Administrative review occurs
without the knowledge or input of the biological parents, foster par-
ents, or other parties, and is usually based solely upon the examina-
tion of written records. Also, the volunteers or court staff who
review cases may have only limited access to confidential records.
Because of the incomplete nature of reviews, some children who
could benefit greatly from judicial review are not identified.62
Court-administered review relies heavily upon the judgment of
the employee, and reviews conducted by teams rather than individu-
als would be preferable.63 Reviewers should be chosen from a group
of people outside the child welfare system to preserve the indepen-
dent nature of the review.6'
caseworkers. One or both biological parents appeared in only 19% of the cases, and over 90%
of the dispositions continued foster care. Id at 274-75.
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978) (review after six months in
care and thereafter at least annually); N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1978)
(review after eighteen months in care and every twenty-four months thereafter).
58. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra and notes 66-73 and accompanying
text infra;, See also H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 38-39. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-50
to 4C-65 (West Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1501 to 37-1510 (1977 and Supp. 1978).
59. Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 6.
60. Id
61. See note 54 supra.
62. Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 6.
63. M. JONES, supra note 12, at 36.
64. Id
C Citizen Board Review
Citizen board review65 refers to periodic review of foster care
placements by a panel composed of citizens who are typically ap-
pointed by an elected official or judge. Board members are chosen
from a group of people having interest or experience in child care,
and they often receive a per diem reimbursement for participation in
review proceedings. The frequency of reviews depends upon legisla-
tive mandate.
Citizen participation in the review process promotes community
awareness of problems faced by foster children and agencies.66 The
review board is able to look closely at the foster care system in oper-
ation and board members often become advocates of the need for
increased resources. 67 Citizen review boards use judicial time effi-
ciently. A judge becomes involved only when a person is aggrieved
by an action or decision of the board or when the case is referred for
judicial action.68 The citizen board can spend more time to review a
case than might a judge and allow interested parties the opportunity
to attend and be heard at the review.69 The size of the reviewing
body helps ensure that the decision will be a collective one, incorpo-
rating the expertise of individual members.7" The impartial nature
of the decision is reinforced because of the independence of the
board from the child care agency.7'
Administration of citizen board review on a statewide basis al-
lows the continuous monitoring of a particular child or sibling group
by the same citizen board.72 Many states using a statewide citizen
board review system have formed a statewide advisory council,
which develops uniform policies, procedures and training methods,
gathers statistics, and provides a focal group to articulate foster care
65. South Carolina has used citizen board review since 1974. In the South Carolina sys-
tem five members sit on each board, and every judicial circuit has at least one review board.
Each board is responsible for reviewing the cases of approximately 100 children. The program
is coordinated by a small staff and includes a legislatively mandated State Advisory Board
composed of representatives from the local boards. S.C. CODE §§ 43-13-10 to 43-13-80 (1976
and Supp. 1978); Chappell, Organizing Periodic Review in Foster Care: The South Carolina
Story 54 CHILD WELFARE 477 (1975); S.C. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 47. Other states
using a citizen review board system include Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 8-515 to 8-515.04
(Supp. 1978), and Maryland, MD. Soc. SERVS. Admin. Code Ann. §§ 114-120 (1979).
66. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24; N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12.
67. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24.
68. Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 8-9.
69. Id at 8.
70. Id at 8-9.
71. Id at 8.
72. Id Festinger observed that in New York City the vast majority ofjudicial reviews of
the same child over a period of time are not heard by the same judge. Festinger, The Impact of
the New York Court Review of Children in Foster Care.'A Followup Report, 55 CHILD WELFARE
515, 522-23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Followup Report].
needs before the state legislature.73 An administrative staff is neces-
sary in a citizen board review system to organize and assist the
boards.74
The disadvantages of citizen board review center around possi-
ble staffing problems. The composition of the board is a crucial ele-
ment to the success of this system. A board should be staffed by
interested and capable people who are available for reviews. Al-
though the majority of states using this system of review provide a
per diem reimbursement to board members,75 which may encourage
professionals to contribute their time,76 and although minimum
guidelines for board selection are usually provided,77 effective board
members may be difficult to obtain. Lay citizens may not be suffi-
ciently knowledgeable about the child care system to make informed
decisions, or they may defer to the agency's recommendation with-
out question.78
To assemble the most effective board possible, potential mem-
bers should be carefully screened and prepared for board duty. A
finite term of board membership should be specified 79 and members
with a record of poor attendance should be dismissed. 0
IV. Preserving the Integrity of Child Placement Review:
Common Concerns Among the Review Systems
A. Needfor Hearings
Although each review scheme has different characteristics, the
73. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 43-13-10 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-62 (West Supp.
1978); Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 8.
74. Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 9-10. In South Carolina the staff also includes
an attorney to assist the boards in petitioning the court. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note
24.
75. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-57 (West Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 43-13-30
(1976); but cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1505 (1977) (no compensation or reimbursement of
expenses to be provided); New Jersey Senate Bill 1208(8) (1978) (no compensation but reim-
bursement for all reasonable and necessary expenses provided).
76. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24.
77. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-57 (West Supp. 1978) (each board to consist of five
members who are county residents; board members to have either training, experience or inter-
est in issues concerning child placement or child development; members should represent the
socioeconomic, racial and ethnic groups of that county); OHiO REV. CODE ANN § 5103.151
(Page Supp. 1978) (if appointed, board is to be composed of one member representing the
general public and four members who are trained or experienced in the care or placement of
children); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1505 (1977) (each board may include a pediatrician or other
doctor, a lawyer, a member of a human resource agency, a mother or father with a minor
child, and a person between the ages of 18 and 25).
78. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24 (concerning deference to agency's recommen-
dation).
79. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-57 (West Supp. 1978); OHfo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5103.151 (Page Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1505 (1977).
80. See S.C. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 47, at 6.
various schemes share the need for certain features to ensure effec-
tive review. One necessary feature is a periodic hearing to review the
status of children in foster placement.
Not all child placement review paradigms include a hearing.8'
Some review systems make no provision for any interested party to
be present8 2 or to submit a writing to the reviewing authority.
8 3
Even those states that provide for judicial review almost uniformly
specify that the court may dispense with the hearing and make a
determination based upon affidavits and writings submitted to the
court with the parties'
84 consent.85
Hearings at which all interested parties are present provide a
better means of accomplishing the legislative purpose of child place-
ment review than a closed-door agency determination or a "paper
review."86 The reviewing authority can obtain information from the
caseworker, parents, foster parents, child and others present at the
hearing to more fully understand the particular situation and can re-
examine the plan for achieving a permanent home for the child. The
reviewing body is also able to remind parents and agency representa-
tives of their responsibilities toward the child and to monitor and
record their performance.
The full hearing provides greater protection for the rights of all
concerned parties, by ensuring that they are aware that a review will
take place and are given the opportunity to be present at the pro-
ceeding. These protections are especially necessary for the biological
parents because their right to custody of the child may be jeopard-
ized by their inaction over the course of a few proceedings.87 In rec-
81. A hearing is not held when an agency determination is made, or when a "paper
review" by a judge or citizen board, or a review by a member of the court administrative staff,
is conducted.
82. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.151 (Page Supp. 1978); CIP staff review de-
scribed in note 50 and accompanying text supra.
83. Even if the opportunity to submit a statement is available, many parents may be
unaware of the opportunity or too poor to obtain assistance in preparing a statement. See
Geiser, supra note 15, at 27.
84. The interpretation of the term "party" in the foster placement review context varies
from state to state but generally includes the biological parents, foster parents, and agency. It
is often unclear whether the child is a party.
85. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168(3)(b) (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW
§ 392(6) (McKinney Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 16.1-282(C) (Supp. 1978) (hearing to be sched-
uled if judge, upon review of agency's petition to court, determines good cause has been
shown); see also New Jersey Senate Bill 1208(5), (10) (1978) (proposed amendment to N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-50 to 4C-65 (West Supp. 1978)) (court to make initial review based solely
upon written materials; thereafter citizen board to make reviews with discretion to request
appearance of any notified party). But Sf ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-515 (1978) (parties always
notified and permitted to attend hearing).
86. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24. See also Followup Report, supra note 72, at
516, 543.
87. See In re Carl & Annette N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1977); N.Y. Soc.
SERVS. LAW § 384-b(7) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (failure to visit and plan for the child consti-
tutes grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1502
ognition of the biological parents' interest in the foster care review,
the court in Guardianship of Denlow88 held that biological parents
are entitled to a plenary and evidentiary hearing, and advance notice
of the possible dispositional alternatives. Since the review is meant
to be of primary benefit to the child,89 no other party should be al-
lowed to waive the hearing.
Some programs have chosen to limit the scope of review not
only by limiting hearings, but also by excluding either voluntary9° or
court-ordered9 t placements from review. Review of both types of
out-of-home placement is necessary, however. Voluntary place-
ments most often occur without court intervention, and would never
be scrutinized by a body independent of the child care agency if not
included in the child placement review scheme. Although involun-
tary placement occurs as a result of a court order, a subsequent pro-
ceeding is necessary to assure prompt return of the child to the
biological parents or termination of parental rights, since the average
length of foster placemant is five years.92
B. Timing of Hearings
Many systems for review of voluntary placements call for a
hearing only after the child has been in care continuously for a cer-
tain period.93 To halt inappropriate entry into foster care, however,
the child should not be placed outside his home initially9 4 unless re-
moval is necessary for his physical or emotional health. The most
certain method of preventing unnecessary foster care placement is to
(Supp. 1978) (noncompliance by the parent with the statement of responsibilities prepared
upon initial placement provides grounds for termination of parental rights). See also CAL.
CIVIL CODE §§ 232(a)(7), 232.1(a)(7) (West Supp. 1978).
88. 87 Misc. 2d 410, 412 n.3, 384 N.Y.S.2d 621, 625 n.3 (1976).
89. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978). "It is the intent of the Legis-
lature ... to help ensure a permanent home for children in foster care by providing a periodic
review and report on their status." See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-51 (West Supp. 1978):
"[I]t is the purpose of this act to establish procedures for both administrative and judicial
review of each child's placement in order to ensure that such placement serves the best interest
of the child."
90. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN § 37-1501(c) (1977). The CIP program applies only to
court-ordered placement of children. See note 50 supra.
91. See, e.g., New Jersey Senate Bill 1208(4) (1978).
92. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
93. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978) (first review occurs after child is
in foster care for a continuous period of six months); N.Y. Soc. SERvS. LAW § 392 (McKinney
Supp. 1978) (review after the child has been in foster care for a continuous period of eighteen
months; if the child is removed from foster care for less than three months, the previous period
in care is tacked to the re-entry period); S.C. CODE § 43-13-40 (1976) (review after child is in
foster care for six months); VA. CODE § 16.1-282(A) (Supp. 1978) (first review takes place
twelve months after the filing of a foster care plan for the child).
94. In certain instances holding a hearing before the child is removed may not be feasi-
ble, for example, when the child is temporarily abandoned by his parents. A hearing should
then be held as soon as possible after the child has left his home.
require a hearing before removing the child from his home. 95 The
judge can determine whether available support services would elimi-
nate the need for foster care.9 6 Provisions of a hearing would also
ensure that surrender of the child is voluntary97 and provide a time
to specify the terms of the agreement, make a plan for the return of
the child to the home, 98 set up a visitation schedule,99 and explain to
the parents the consequences of their failure to fulfill their obliga-
tions towards the child.l°° Also, if the child is being removed from
his home because he has been abused, this should be noted on the
record and not hidden beneath a "voluntary" agreement because it
may furnish support for termination of parental rights in the future.
Reviews should occur on a regular schedule after the initial re-
moval hearing. In addition to cyclic monitoring, a child's placement
in foster care should be reviewed in a hearing upon the occurrence of
any event that may significantly affect the need for continued place-
ment.' 0 These events might include the agency's intention to place
95. The New Jersey procedure requires that the hearing take place within fifteen days
after notice is received by the court that the child has been removed from his home. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4C-54 (West Supp. 1978). Logic dictates, however, that the hearing be held before
the child is displaced.
Reasons for introduction of judicial review of voluntary placements in New Jersey in-
clude the following: (1) to advise parents of their rights (e.g., to regain child); (2) to protect
parents by ensuring that the placement is voluntary and to determine if continued placement
outside the home is warranted; and (3) to protect the best interests of the child by deciding
whether he should be returned home. Interview with Steven Yoslov, Chief, Juvenile and Do-
mestic Relations Court Services, Administrative Office of the Courts, State of New Jersey
(Aug. 17, 1978).
96. Provision of supportive services to the family (e.g., day care, homemaker services,
mental health counseling, housing programs, AFDC, food stamps or job training) are avail-
able either directly or through purchase by the state agency and may alleviate the need for out-
of-home placement. N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12; S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note
24.
97. See In re H., 77 Misc. 2d 807, 355 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1974) (one of the primary purposes of
§ 358-a of the New York Social Services Law is to scrutinize voluntary placements). N.Y.
Soc. SERVS. LAW § 358-a (McKinney Supp. 1978).
At least one state requires a hearing for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to
ensure that the parent's consent to termination of parental rights is voluntary, deliberate and
intelligent. See In re Adoption of Wolfe, 454 Pa. 550, 312 A.2d 793 (1973). Although the
focus here is on temporary surrender of child custody, this surrender together with noncompli-
ance with the foster care plan in Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1502 (Supp. 1978), or
failure to visit and plan for the child in New York, N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 384-b(7) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978), is sufficient for a decree of involuntary termination of parental rights, and
therefore, a hearing is also necessary when the child is temporarily surrendered to protect the
parents' rights and the child's welfare.
98. In many review systems the agency and parent must together develop a foster care
plan when the child is removed from the home. Eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-55 (West Supp.
1978); VA. CODE § 16.1-281 (Supp. 1978).
99. Studies indicate a strong correlation between the frequency of parental visiting and
discharge of children from foster care. E.g., Fanshel, Parental Visiting of Children in Foster
Care: Key to Discharge, 49 Soc. SERV. REV. 493, 501-02 (1975); Maas, supra note 23, at 324-
25.
100. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
101. E. CLAYBURN AND S. MAGURA, supra note 37, at 1-4. Clayburn views the two types
of periodicity as complementary. Time orientation signals when no progress is being made in
the child in a new foster home or in an institution, 10 2 the intent to
separate siblings, 0 3 or improvement of the parent's ability to care for
the child, for example, because of release from prison or a treatment
center. Reviews should also be available upon the petition of foster
parents °4 and other interested parties.
10 5
The length of the period between reviews is a critical factor in
the effectiveness of a review program. Reviews too widely spaced
will permit the weakening of family ties and will lessen the chance of
the child's returning home.'" Prolonged stay in foster care is often
marked by multiple placements, which may have emotionally dam-
aging effects on the child.'07 Furthermore, as the child advances in
age he becomes more difficult to place for adoption. 08 Reviews
should be spaced widely enough, however, to allow the parents a
period in which to demonstrate compliance with the plan and to
show interest in the child. In determining the frequency of review,
the child's perspective of the passage of time should be consid-
ered. 0 9 What may seem a short period of out-of-home placement to
an adult, for example a period of six months, may be perceived by a
child to include a major portion of his life.
More frequent reviews are feasible when a less expensive review
procedure is used. Currently, the range among review programs ex-
tends from a six month cycle to a twenty-four month cycle. I 0  The
shorter cycle of six months is preferable because foster placement
can be more frequently reviewed and placement of the child in a
permanent home hastened."'
a case, and event orientation allows the most rapid possible detection and response to changes
in the case.
102. See In re Mark H., 80 Misc. 2d 593, 363 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1974) (foster care review pro-
ceeding in which the agency was directed not to institutionalize the child again without the
court's permission).
103. See F.B. v. State, 319 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (court has responsibility
to protect interests of children removed from their parental home as a sibling group).
104. See, e.g., In re Custody of Mack, 81 Misc. 2d 802, 367 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1975); N.Y.
Soc. SERVs. LAW § 392(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
105. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1509 (1977) (any interested party is allowed to file
petition for rehearing while the child is under the jurisdiction of the court).
106. See Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 4.
107. Id See also note 129 and accompanying text infra.
108. Chappell & Hevener, supra note 38, at 4.
109. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, AND A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 40-49 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
110. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978) (judicial review after six months
in placement and thereafter annually); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-54, 4C-58 (West Supp. 1978)
(review by judge within fifteen days of placement, review by citizen board within forty-five
days of placement and annually thereafter by citizen board); N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 392
(McKinney Supp. 1978) (judicial review after 18 months and biennially thereafter); S.C. CODE
§ 43-13-40 (1976) (semi-annual citizen board review).
S11. One administrator of a review program expressed the view that reviews should be
held at three to four month intervals. S.C. Chappell Interview, supra note 24.
C. Standards/or Scrutinizing Out- Of-Home Child Placement
1. Judicial Determinations to Remove the Child From the
Home.-When a child is placed outside his home pursuant to court
order, the standard applied by the court in determining whether to
remove the child will depend upon the state's reason for interven-
tion. Involuntary out-of-home placement may be ordered as part of
the disposition in a juvenile court proceeding" I2 or upon a finding of
parental neglect 1 3 or abuse. " 4 Voluntary placements are most fre-
quently arranged between parents and agency without court supervi-
sion.11 5 If, however, a hearing is held before the parents voluntarily
surrender their child, the standard applied by the court in deciding
whether to remove the child is whether continued stay in the home
would be contrary to the welfare of the child." I 6
2. Standards for Continuance of Out-Of-Home Care.-The
general standard applied'17 when there is a conflict regarding cus-
tody between the biological parent and the agency or foster parent is
whether return of the child to his home would be in the child's best
interests."' The best interests standard is perhaps the most nebu-
lous" 9 and yet the most crucial standard applied by the courts in
determining a child's welfare. Courts for many years have linked
the best interests of the child with other parties to the custody pro-
ceeding. The child's best interest frequently is considered identical
to the rights of the biological parent, 2 ' and in some proceedings
counsel for the petitioning agency also represents the child since
their interests are presumed to be identical.'
2 1
112. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-61 (West Supp. 1978). See also H. GOLDIN, supra
note 12, at 3.
113. For a thorough analysis of child neglect proceedings and a proposed standard for
initial state intervention on behalf of neglected children see Wald, supra note 29, at 642-660.
114. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 1052 (McKinney 1975). See also H. GOLDIN,
supra note 12, at 3.
115. Geiser, supra note 15, at 27.
116. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-54 (West Supp. 1978). See also notes 118-45 and
accompanying text infra.
117. See also Wald, supra note 29, at 660-76 (discussion of a proposed standard tailored to
custody determinations of neglected children).
118. See N.Y.U. L. REV. supra note 11, at 448-49.
119. Elements taken into consideration in determining a child's best interests vary with the
court, the type of action, and the relationship of the parties to the child. LEGAL ISSUES IN
FOSTER CARE, supra note 15, at 20-21.
120. See, e.g., Ruth v. Beaudoin, 55 App. Div. 2d 52, 389 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1976); In re
Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959). See also In
re Kimberly P., 84 Misc. 2d 887, 376 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1975); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 65-
66. But ef. In re S., 74 Misc. 2d 935, 347 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1973) (dilemma of parental rights in
conffict with children's rights); In re S., 74 Misc. 2d 154, 347 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1973) (discussing
the best interests of the child with respect to the rights of the biological parents).
121. J. PERS, supra note 12, at 20. See also Katz, Foster Parents versus Agencies.- A Case
Study in the JudicialApplication of "The Best Interests ofthe Child"Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV.
145, 153 (1966). But cf In re Alexander, 206 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1968) (foster parents of child for
Courts also recognize and incorporate into the best interests de-
termination the "paramount parental right to raise one's own
child."' 22 Thus, when the best interests standard is applied in pro-
ceedings in which the parents' interests diverge from those of the
child, the parents' interests are often accorded greater weight.
123
One illustration of this conflict is the case of Ross v. Reeves. 124 Two
children had been taken from their biological parents upon a finding
of neglect and placed with foster parents for several years. The bio-
logical parents successfully sought a court order to take the children
from the foster parents and place them in an orphanage. The or-
phanage was to provide a "neutral" setting in which the children
could reestablish ties with their biological parents, and the foster
parents were prohibited from visiting the children. The paramount
right protected was not the children's interest in a stable and emo-
tionally secure home but rather the custodial interest of the biologi-
cal parent.
Another legal principle often employed in child custody cases is
the biological parents' right to custody of the child until they are
proved unfit. 125 For example, in Spence-Chapin Adoption Service v.
four years desired to adopt child but the agency claimed they were too old to adopt; court
ordered adoption over agency disapproval); In re Klug, 32 App. Div. 2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1969) (Tilzer, J., concurring) (discussing the conflict in the agency role as binder of family
wounds and protector of the best interests of the child); In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266
N.Y.S.2d 756 (1966) (counsel for the agency said he regarded foster home care as meeting all
the child's needs, and the court concluded that the agency was ineffective in giving these mi-
nority children a permanent home). For further recognition of the divurgence of interests
between child and agency see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 66; Genden, Separate Legal Rep-
resentationfor Children. Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, II
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 575 (1976); Katz, LegalAspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283,
289-90 (1971).
122. E.g., Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 204, 274 N.E.2d 431,
435, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (1971).
123. See, e.g., In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1959). The New York Court of Appeals approved the transfer of a five year old girl from
the home of her foster parents to the agency for new foster placement, pending "eventual"
return home to her biological mother. The girl had spent four years with her foster parents
and she identified them as her own parents. They desired very much to adopt her. The court
found it to be in the best interests of the child to remove her before "further damage is done."
Psychiatrist for the appellants had testified in substance that the child was well-adjusted in her
foster home and that removal from her foster home might prove emotionally disruptive. The
agency conceded that the child was in a good home environment but they wanted to place her
in a "neutral environment." See also Ross v. Reeves, No. W66F243J (Ill. Civ. Ct. Mar. 9,
1973); Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562
(1974); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 54.
124. No. W66F243J (Ill. Civ. Ct. Mar. 9, 1973).
125. See, e.g., Doe v. G.D., 149 N.J. Super. 419, 370 A.2d 27 (1976); Spence-Chapin
Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971); People ex
rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1971). But cf. In re B.G., I I Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974) (the court
must expressly find that parental custody would be detrimental to the child, supported by
evidence that parental custody would actually harm the child, to withhold custody from par-
ent).
Polk'2 6 the court posited that "[c]hild and parent are entitled to be
together, unless compelling reason stemming from dire circum-
stances or gross misconduct forbid [sic] it in the paramount interest
of the child .. ."27 The best interests of the child, however, re-
quire that the child should not be shuffled around in foster care but
should be given a permanent home, even if his biological parents are
fit but unwilling or unable to resume custody in the near future.
28
Emotional, mental, and social problems of the foster child increase
with the length of time in care. 
29
A more realistic judicial approach in making custody determi-
nations should be based upon certain fundamental premises. One
premise is that the child should always be a party to the proceed-
ing.13 0 He has a direct and personal interest in the decision and his
rights may be adversely affected by it. In Stapleton v. Dauphin
County Child Care Service' 3' the court regarded the foster child as a
party and observed that to say the child is the subject of the action
but not a party is to adopt the view of child-as-chattel.'32
Courts should recognize that the best interests of the child are
independent of and sometimes conflicting with the rights of other
parties. 33 Neither the parent nor the agency can adequately repre-
sent the child in a custody proceeding because their interests are not
identical.1 34 The parental interest in custody should be recognized
by judicial acceptance of a rebuttable presumption that the biologi-
cal parents are best fit to care for their child. 35 Although the best
interests of the child must be regarded as paramount to the right to
126. 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971).
127. Id at 199, 274 N.E.2d at 432-33, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
128. See N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 11, at 447. "Rarely... have the courts adequately
resolved the tension often present in the natural parents' assertion of a biological right to a
continuous relationship with their child and the child's need for a caring and stable home
environment." Id at 447. See also In re Orzo, 84 Misc. 2d 482, 374 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1975)
(observing that a child is no less in limbo when kept in foster care year after year when the
parent is physically and financially able to provide a home but fails to do so).
129. Geiser, supra note 15, at 35; H. GOLDIN, supra note 12, at 10-12.
130. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 65-67. The authors note that courts and legisla-
tures have failed to grant the child party status except in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id
131. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
132. Id at 392, 324 A.2d at 573.
133. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra. See also Teeter v. Pruiksma, 47 App.
Div. 2d 101, 364 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1975) (in habeas corpus proceeding instituted by biological
family against foster parents to demand return of the child, the child's appointed guardian
contended that the child has rights independent of those of his biological or foster parents and
requested a full hearing with best interests determination, unrestricted by a presumption in
favor of any party).
134. In re Kimberly P., 84 Misc. 2d 887, 376 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1975).
135. See In re Two Minor Children, 283 A.2d 859 (Del. Ch., 1971). See also Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976) (prolonged separation of
mother and child for most of child's life is a major factor in rebutting the presumption in favor
of parental custody).
rear one's own child,' 36 the rights of the biological parents should
receive strong judicial consideration. This view has received increas-
ing judicial approval in recent years.
3 7
The best interest standard should be defined to hinge not upon
the quality of surroundings, but rather on the display of continued
interest and concern and maintenance of a relationship with the
child. 31 When these are shown all efforts should be made to main-
tain parental custody.
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Another fundamental consideration is that a judge's decision
whether to award custody to the biological parents or to the adoptive
parents to best serve the child's interest is subjective,"4 and the out-
come is incapable of prediction.' 4 ' Considerations used in the best
interests determination should be statutorily defined with room for
the discretion of the judge.'42 The judge should be required to spec-
ify the factual grounds supporting his decision, which provides a ba-
sis for review and imposes a limit on judicial discretion.'43
Finally, the interests of the public must be considered.'" Al-
though not formally present at the proceedings, the public has an
interest in the tax money spent to support the child and in ensuring
that the child has the best upbringing possible, to assure that he will
become a productive and well-adjusted member of the commu-
136. See N.Y.U. L. REV., upra note 11, at 446-47 (reviewing United States Supreme
Court decisions recognizing the importance of the family unit).
137. See, e.g., In re Camm, 294 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1974); In re Orzo, 84 Misc. 2d 482, 374
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1975) (the New York Legislature has shown increasing solicitude for the rights
of children when children's rights have come in conflict with parent's rights); In re L., 77 Misc.
2d 363, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1974); In re Petition for Relocation of Children From Foster Home
for the Purpose of Placement in a Permanent Home, No. 13 Adoptions 1975, 14 Adoptions
1975 (Pa. D. & C., C.P. Cumb. Aug. 30, 1978); In re Z., 81 Wis. 2d 194, 260 N.W.2d 246
(1977). See also In re Kimberly P., 84 Misc. 2d 887, 376 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1975) (presumption
that the biological parent has a superior right to the child weakens when the parent surrenders
custody for a long period).
138. See note 28 and accompanying text supra
139. See Goldstein, supra note 5, at 649-50.
140. For a case in which courts of two states applied the best interests standard and
reached contrary decisions see People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28
N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971); N.Y.U. L. REV., supra note 11, at 455
n.56 (description of contrary holding in Scarpeta).
141. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563
F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (Brown, C.J., concurring). The judge, in referring to questions of
child placement, wrote, "On what do we draw in making these choices? Are we, as Federal
Judges, endowed with sufficient prescience to decide such delicate issues?" Id at 1212. See
also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 49-52; Mnookin, supra note 56, at 226-293.
142. N.Y.U. L. REV. supra note 11, at 469-70; see In re Petition for Relocation of Children
From Foster Home for the Purpose of Placement in a Permanent Home, No. 13 Adoptions
1975, 14 Adoptions 1975 (Pa. D. & C., C.P. Cumb. Aug. 30, 1978). Elements might include the
preference of the child, the length of separation from biological parents and their demonstra-
tion of continued interest in the child, and the length of time the child has lived with the foster
parents.
143. Mnookin, supra note 56, at 277-81.
144. In re Z., 81 Wis. 2d 194, 260 N.W.2d 246 (1977).
nity. 145
D. Safeguarding the Rights of the Parties
1. Notice.-Notice of the foster care review proceeding should
be given to all interested parties. 46 Although notice of a judicial or
citizen board hearing is usually required by statute, 147 most jurisdic-
tions employing court-administered or agency review make no pro-
vision for notice of the review.
48
Notice of a hearing to both biological parents is normally re-
quired in all statutory review schemes, 149 if the whereabouts of both
parties are known. It is important to notify both parents to give each
an opportunity to come forward and show interest in the child, 5 °
even if the parents are separated.'' Preferably, notice should do
more than merely alert the parties of a hearing. Parents should be
informed of the specific issue that will be considered' 52 and advised
that failure to appear and assume responsibility for the child may
result in the deprivation of parental rights.'53 Notice should be
timely' 1 4 and in writing.
In addition to notice to biological parents, notice should be
given to the foster parents. 5 5 As parties interested in the promotion
of the child's welfare, foster parents should have the right to attend
145. See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
146. This would include relatives of the child who have shown an interest in the custody
of the child. See Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976); (In re
A.A. Mc., 140 Ga. App. 786, 232 S.E.2d 104 (1976).
147. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-515 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168(4)
(West Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-59 (West Supp. 1978) (notice of hearing, to be
provided at least fifteen days in advance to the agency, chairperson of the review board, child,
child's parent or legal guardian, and any other persons or agencies whom the court determines
have an interest in, or information relating to, the welfare of the child); N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW
§ 392 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (notice, including a statement of dispositional alternatives, to be
given to the agency, foster parents, child's parent or guardian who transferred the care and
custody of the child temporarily to the agency, a person to whom a parent entrusted the care of
the child, when that person transferred the care of the child to the agency, and to other persons
as the court may direct); VA. CODE § 16.1-282(C) (Supp. 1978).
148. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5103.151 (Page Supp. 1978). But C. CAL. WEL. &
INSTS. CODE § 16557(d) (West Supp. 1978) (demonstration counties only) (notice of adminis-
trative review given to minor's parents or guardians).
149. See note 147 supra.
150. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); In re Baby Boy S., 349 So. 2d 774 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (when the putative father gives any affirmative indicative of interest in the
child he must be given notice and a hearing before parental rights can be taken away).
151. At least 40% of foster children come from one-parent families. Geiser, supra note 15,
at 27.
152. See, e.g., New York requirement of a statement of dispositional alternatives, supra
note 147.
153. Notice of this type is required in dependency proceedings, see In re Martin, 3 Wash.
App. 405, 476 P.2d 134 (1970). See also note 87 supra.
154. See, e.g., New Jersey statute at note 147 supra.
155. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 8-515(D) (Supp. 1978) (notice given to any foster par-
ents in whose home the child has resided within the last six months, except those foster parents
any hearing regarding the welfare of their foster child.' 56 Notice of
the proceeding to the child or child's legal representative is likewise
necessary since the child is the focus of the proceeding and is most
affected by the determination. Finally, children of a certain age
should be given the opportunity to voice their feelings to the judge,
citizen board, or legal representative.
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2. Representation.-Most child placement review systems are
silent regarding any party's right to representation by appointed or
retained counsel or to bring another person with him to a review." 8
No federal constitutional right to counsel has yet been found for in-
digent parties in foster care proceedings.' 59 Nevertheless, at least
one state court has ruled that indigent parents are entitled to ap-
pointed counsel in child placement review proceedings. 60 A larger
number of states require that counsel be appointed to represent indi-
gent parents in proceedings for permanent deprivation of the cus-
tody of their child, 16 ' because of the fundamental nature of a
parent's custodial interest 62 and the recognition that the proceeding
may result in the loss of substantial rights.
163
maintaining a "receiving" foster home). But cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-59 (West Supp.
1978) (notice to foster parents not specifically required).
156. See James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Conn. 1969) (discussing rights of
foster parents). See generally Comment, Foster Parents'Emerging Due Process Rights in Penn-
sylvania, 83 DICK. L. REV. 123 (1978).
157. See Allen v. Dep't for Human Resources, 540 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1976) (ten year old
child's wishes should be carefully considered in granting custody because if the child opposes
the decision, efforts to provide him with a permanent home will be defeated); Commonwealth
v. Children's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973). But cf. Guardianship of
Denlow, 87 Misc. 2d 410, 416 n.8, 384 N.Y.S.2d 621, 627 n.8 (1976) (child's wish to be adopted
by foster parents is dismissed by court as being "immature," "emotional" and of little mean-
ing). See generally Siegel & Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in Custody Proceedings,
11 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1977).
158. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-
50 to 4C-65 (West Supp. 1978).
159. Although the United States Supreme Court has found a right to counsel for indigents
in certain criminal proceedings, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) and juvenile delinquency actions, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
they have not extended the right to counsel for indigents generally in civil proceedings. Al-
though lacking the legal effect of affirming the lower court ruling, the Court has declined to
review a case denying indigent parents the right to counsel in child dependency proceedings.
Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 964, denying cert. to 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970).
See generally Comment, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 989 (1975).
160. In re Janice K., 82 Misc. 2d 983, 372 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1975).
161. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying California law);
Danforth v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re Friesz, 190 Neb.
347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973); Crist v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 135 N.J.
Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (1975); In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1972); State v. Jamison, 251 Or. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968); In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29,
312 A.2d 601 (1973); In re Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); State ex rel.
Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1975). See also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,
supra note 30, at Appendix E, Tables II and III.
162. See, e.g., In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
163. See, e.g., In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973).
In the foster care review setting, the danger of loss of parental
rights may not be perceived because parental rights will not be ter-
minated in the review proceeding itself. Parental rights may, how-
ever, be terminated subsequently in a separate proceeding because of
a parent's failure to show continued interest in and to plan for his
child.'" To protect the rights of the parent and the interest of the
child the parent must be informed at the hearing of the consequences
of his failure to assume responsibility for the child as specified in the
foster care plan. If counsel is not appointed, the judge, citizen board,
or agency representative should assist the parent in fixing a visitation
schedule and should make certain that the parent understands his
rights and responsibilities. The parent should be given counsel in
the subsequent termination proceeding if the child's representative'
65
recommends that parental rights be terminated.
66
Various means are available to provide representation for the
child.167 These include the appointment of a legal guardian, other
counsel substitute, or an attorney. 68 The child needs representa-
tion' 69 because his interest in the proceeding is the most substantial,
he is unable to speak effectively for himself, and his interests are not
adequately representated by anyone else.' 70  The appointment of
counsel to protect the interests of the child in foster care review pro-
ceedings usually is not required by statute.' 7' Many states specify in
proceedings involving neglect, abuse, or the possible termination of
parental rights that appointment of counsel for the child is at the
court's discretion.
72
Foster parents have traditionally been extended few rights in
connection with their child care responsibilities. 7  Courts have
viewed the foster parent-child relationship strictly according to the
terms 174 of the foster care agreement. 175 Yet foster parents have a
164. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
165. See notes 167-72 and accompanying text infra.
166. See note 161 and accompanying text supra.
167. See generally Genden, supra note 121.
168. For various alternatives to counsel for the child see Genden, supra note 121, at 594-
95.
169. The appointment of a legal representative for the child in placement decisions is
advocated by authorities in the juvenile law field. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 66-67;
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra note 26, at 10. See also Genden,
supra note 121, at 581-86 (discussing possible sources of authority for the appointment of a
representative for the child).
170. See notes 120-21, 123, 125, 130 supra.
171. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (Vest Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE §§ 43-13-10 to
43-13-80 (1976 and Supp. 1978).
172. See J. PERS., supra note 12, at 29.
173. See Katz, Legal Aspects ofFoster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 287-301 (1971); Comment,
The Rights ofFoster Parents to the Children in Their Care, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 86, 87-102
(1973).
174. See Katz, supra note 173, at 288; 9 CONN. L. REV. 496 (1977).
175. For text of a sample foster care agreement see Katz, supra note 173, at 288-89.
special and important interest in proceedings concerning the child's
custody. They are the de facto custodians 7 6 of the child and often
have a personal interest in the child's future because of the nature of
the foster care relationship,'77 the length of the child's stay in their
home, and possibly the desire to adopt the child.178 Only in recent
years have courts begun to grant foster parents standing to intervene
in custody determinations concerning the foster child. 179 Foster par-
ents who have cared for a child for a specified period, for example
four months, should be allowed to intervene as interested parties in
any proceeding affecting the child. Because the foster parent is not
generally accorded parental rights, 80 foster parents will have to re-
tain their own counsel.
3. Confidentiality. -The problem of confidentiality is perhaps
the most troublesome and unresolved area of the review proceed-
ing. '8 Much information must be collected by the reviewing au-
thority to make an appropriate determination. 82  Also, the various
parties need to be fully informed to properly assess and advocate
their own positions, cross-examine witnesses, and challenge the accu-
racy of records. Many of the documents that would supply relevant
information, however, are considered confidential. 83  Confidential
176. The agency is the de jure custodian of the child. Note 18 supra.
177. Foster parents are asked to assume a role during long-term placement of the child
that is inherently contradictory; they are expected to be substitute parents without forming an
emotional attachment to the child. Katz, supra note 173, at 290-91.
178. State practices differ in according foster parents preference in adoption proceedings
to adopt a child for whom they have cared. See Legal Issues in Foster Care, supra note 15, at
11-12.
179. See, e.g., Cennami v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 363 N.E.2d 539 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977);
Mundie v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 88 Misc. 2d 273, 387 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1976);
Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
See also In re Kimberly P., 84 Misc. 2d 887, 376 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1975) (court reasoned that the
longer the foster parents care for the child, the stronger their interest becomes). But cf. Eason
v. Welfare Comm'r, 171 Conn. 630, 370 A.2d 1082 (1976) (foster parents of seven years have
no standing to bring action to revoke commitment of child to agency); W.C. v. P.M., 155 N.J.
Super. 555, 383 A.2d 125 (1978) (foster parents have no standing or protected interest to de-
mand plenary hearing before agency removes child); Ocasio v. Ocasio, 49 App. Div. 2d 801,
373 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975) (foster parents failed to establish right to intervene in custody pro-
ceeding because they had not cared for child for the statutorily required period of twenty-four
months).
180. See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (foster parent relationship gives rise to no state-created constitutional right
as the "psychological parent" of the child). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). But cf. Pennsylvania Att'y Gen. Op. No. 27, 4
Pa. Bull. 134 (1974) (rights of foster parents stemming from fundamental family relationship
should be no less significant than those of a biological parent).
181. See also Levine, Access to "Confidential" Wefare Records in the Course of Child Pro-
tection Proceedings, 14 J. FAM. L. 535 (1975-76).
182. Although an extensive amount of material is generally included in the child's
casework file, any abstract or summary may be biased, inadequate, and time-consuming to
compile.
183. The Tennessee foster care review law requires that any plan, record, report, review or
material prepared in connection with the planning, placement, or care of a child in foster care
information may include the child's file, the record of events and
observations recorded by the social worker concerning the biological
parents, foster parents and child, the background of foster parents,
and in some cases even the foster parents' identity. 84 This problem
is compounded because a number of laypeople are given access to
confidential information in the course of court-administered' 85 or
citizen board review.
Clearly, some of this information must be divulged for mean-
ingful review. Disclosure of the reason for surrender and frequency
of parental contact is essential. New York has established standards
relating to the breadth of disclosure allowed in judicial review in the
three-part case of In re L. 186 In the first part of the decision the court
required the agency to furnish the parents' counsel with a list stating
the general nature of the materials held by the agency and to move
for a protective order concerning those matters contested. The court
permitted in camera review by parents' counsel of materials that the
child care agency agreed to disclose, and judicial examination of
records that the agency refused to disclose to determine the request-
ing party's need for the information. Immaterial and irrelevant con-
fidential records were not disclosed.8 7 In the second part of the
opinion, the court announced that the standard applied in deciding
to permit disclosure is whether disclosure of the information is in the
best interests of the child. The court further explained that it must
have access to the complete record of the case when making this de-
termination. 
88
The foster parent was recognized as a party to the review in the
third part of the decision of In re L., but his opportunity to obtain
disclosure of records was held available only upon a showing of "ne-
cessity," coupled with an in camera viewing. 89 The subsequent case
of In re Louis F 190 interpreted the showing of necessity required of
foster parents as qualitatively stricter than the showing required of
the biological parents because of the less significant relationship of
is not a matter of public record and must remain confidential. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1507
(Supp. 1977).
184. New Jersey foster parents remain anonymous to the biological parents of the child
for whom they care. N.J. DYFS Interview, supra note 12.
185. See Bailey v. Affleck, Civil Action File No. 75-302 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1975)
(volunteers recruited by Family Court granted access to certain casefiles and information for
use in the Children In Placement Project).
186. 45 App. Div. 2d 375, 357 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1974). This case includes many litigants
raising different issues for determination and the opinion is divided into three fact situations
and opinions.
187. Id at 382-83, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95.
188. Id at 384-85, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97.
189. Id at 386-87, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
190. 54 App. Div. 2d 104, 387 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1976).
the foster parent to the child.' 9 '
Other New York courts, attempting to preserve confidentiality,
have instructed attorneys not to reveal the information obtained
from agency records to their clients.' 92 The court in In re L, how-
ever, maintained that a blanket instruction forbidding the mother's
counsel to make abstracts of the materials disclosed should only is-
sue when clearly needed.'
93
South Carolina, a state using citizen board review, 194 enforces
the requirement of confidentiality by informing each review board
member of its importance and necessity, requiring all records of re-
view proceedings, documents, and notes of board members to be
kept in a locked file when the board is not in session, and subjecting
board members to the same standards of confidentiality as Depart-
ment of Social Services employees of the state, including the imposi-
tion of sanctions for violations. t95
4. Appeal-Most current legislation oes not specify the right
of appeal from a foster placement review decision or the appropriate
procedure. 96 This right of appeal should be specifically provided by
statute. For judicial review systems, the appropriate appellate forum
should be identified. Judicial appeal should also be made available
to parties dissatisfied by the action or decision of a citizen review
board' 97 or agency panel.
V. Conclusion
A variety of elements external to the review scheme itself are
essential to achieve the goal of providing permanent homes for foster
children. One necessary complement of a review system is a worka-
ble statute for termination of parental rights. 198 A state should also
191. Id at 106-07, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
192. Eg., In re L., 77 Misc. 2d 363, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1974).
193. In re L., 45 App. Div. 2d 375, 385, 357 N.Y.S.2d 987, 997 (1974).
194. S.C. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 47, at 29. See also S.C. CODE § 43-13-60
(Supp. 1978) (all agencies that provide for foster care of children must cooperate with review
board by furnishing requested records).
195. Another potential source of confidentiality requirements is found in the Social Secur-
ity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1976); see also 45 C.F.R. 205.50 (1978). These provisions apply
to AFDC programs and in some cases have been extended to a broader variety of child welfare
programs. Levine, supra note 181, at 539-45.
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.168 (West Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-
50 to 4C-65 (West Supp. 1978).
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consider enacting a subsidized adoption law,'9 9 which would supply
permanent homes for children at lower cost to the state than ex-
tended foster care. °° Subsidized adoption permits permanent place-
ment of a child not otherwise eligible for adoption because of
physical or emotional handicaps or other problems. Finally, consis-
tent with the premise that a child needs a stable and permanent
home, the availability of a substantial array of services to families
20'
may eliminate the need for initial removal of the child, at a great
cost savings to the public.
20 2
The provision of an independent child placement review system
serves to assure that foster children are given permanent and stable
homes. For a greater number of children, however, the determining
factor in freeing them from the limbo of foster care will be the ag-
gressive and dedicated attitudes of the people who operate the foster
care system.2 °3
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